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Abstract. Although the blockchain-based applications are considered
to be less vulnerable due to the nature of the distributed ledger, they
did not become the silver bullet with respect to securing the information
against different security risks. In this paper, we present a literature
review on the security risks that can be mitigated by introducing the
blockchain technology, and on the security risks that are identified in the
blockchain-based applications. In addition, we highlight the application
and technology domains where these security risks are observed. The
results of this study could be seen as a preliminary checklist of security
risks when implementing blockchain-based applications.
Keywords: Blockchain · Blockchain-based applications · Decentralized
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1 Introduction
Blockchain is a distributed immutable ledger technology [34]. It gives partici-
pants an ability to share a ledger by peer-to-peer replication and updates every
time when a transaction occurs. A ledger contains a certain and verifiable record
of every single transaction ever made [22]. Security engineering is concerned with
lowering the risk of intentional unauthorized harm to valuable assets to that level
which is acceptable to the systems stakeholders by preventing and reacting to
malicious harm, misuse, threats, and security risks [14]. Security plays an impor-
tant role in blockchain-based applications. Those applications are acknowledged
to be less vulnerable because the use of a decentralized consensus paradigm to
validate the transactional information. They also backed by cryptography tech-
nology. However, the blockchain technology is continuously penetrating various
fields and the involvement of the monetary assets raised the security concerns,
mainly when the attackers stole the monetary assets or damage the system.
For example, the reentrancy attack on the Ethereum based decentralized au-
tonomous organization (DAO) smart contracts when an adversary gained control
on $60 million Ethers [4,26].
Blockchain technology promises to overcome the security challenges, enhance
the data integrity and to transform the transacting process into a decentralized,
transparent and immutable manner. The recent progression of blockchain tech-
nology captured the interest of various sectors to transform their business pro-
cesses by using blockchain-based applications. Hence, the security challenges are
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debatable and there is no comprehensive (or standardized) overview of security
risks which can potentially damage the blockchain-based applications. There ex-
ist few studies reporting on security challenges in the blockchain platforms [4,24],
but there is still a lack of focus on the blockchain-based applications security.
In this paper, we present a systematic literature review (SLR) following the
guidelines of [20]. Our research objectives are twofold. Firstly, we explain what
security risks of centralized applications are mitigated by introducing blockchain-
based applications. Secondly, we report the security risks of the blockchain-based
applications which appear after introducing the blockchain technology. The main
contributions of our study are: (1) a list of security risks in the blockchain-
based applications which mitigate or inherit by incorporating the blockchain
technology/platform, (2) aggregate a list of possible countermeasures and (3)
an overview of the prominent research domains which are nourishing by the
blockchain. The results of this study could be seen as a preliminary checklist of
security risks when implementing blockchain-based applications.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the blockchain and related work. Section 3 presents the contributions which
explain the SLR process and Section 4 discuss its results. In Section 5, conclusion
and future research directions are conferred.
2 Background
In this section, first, we introduce the blockchain technology. Second, we present
an overview of related work.
2.1 Overview of Blockchain Technology
Blockchain forms a chain by a sequence of blocks that replicates over a peer-to-
peer (P2P) network. In the blockchain, each block is attached to the previous
block by a cryptographic hash, a block contains block header and a list of trans-
actions as a Merkle tree. Blockchain is classified as a permissionless or permis-
sioned [31]. In permissionless blockchain, anyone can join or leave the network
and transactions are publicly available. In permissioned blockchain only prede-
fined verified nodes can join the network and transactions visibility is restricted
[2,31].
In the blockchain, a smart contract (SC) is a computer program [4,7] which
constitutes a digital contract to store data and to execute functions [28] when
certain conditions are met. In the ethereum platform, developers use Solidity
programming language to write a smart contract and to build decentralized
applications [7]. In Hyperledger Fabric, a smart contract is called chaincode.
Similarly, other blockchain platforms introduce smart contracts to perform con-
tractual agreements in a digital realm. The smart contracts are the high-level
programming language-based programs and those can be error-prone where se-
curity flaws could be introduced (e.g. the reentrancy bug [26]).
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Blockchain eliminates the trusted intermediary and follows the decentral-
ized consensus mechanism to validate the transactional information. Different
blockchains use various consensus mechanism. Proof of Work (PoW) is a widely
used computational rich energy-waste consensus strategy where special nodes
called miners validate transactions by solving the crypto puzzle. Proof of Stake
(PoS) is an energy-efficient consensus strategy [42] where miners become val-
idators [12] and lock a certain amount of cryptocurrency to show ownership to
participate in the consensus process. There are other consensus mechanisms, for
example, Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS), Proof of Authority (PoA), Proof of
Reputation (PoR) and Proof of Spacetime (PoSt).
The number of blockchain platforms is rapidly growing and thus, security
becomes an important factor of the successful blockchain-based applications.
In this paper, we focus on three frequently used blockchain platforms (Bitcoin,
Ethereum, Hyperledger fabric). In addition, we also look at customised per-
missioned & permissionless platforms (see Table 3). Our goal is to learn which
security risks and threats are considered in the applications of these platforms.
2.2 Related Work
There exist a few surveys, which consider blockchain platforms security risks. For
instance, Li et al. [24] overview the security attacks on the blockchain platforms
& summarise the security enhancements. In our work, we consider the security
risks on the blockchain-based applications and their countermeasures.
Another related study [4] is conducted on Ethereum smart contracts security.
It reports on the major security attacks and presents a taxonomy of common
programming pitfalls, which could result in different vulnerabilities. This study
focuses on the security risks in the Ethereum smart contracts, further inves-
tigation is required to explore possible security risks in smart contracts based
decentralized applications and their viable countermeasures.
The main attributes of blockchain are integrity, reliability and security [21]
which are also important in the IoT systems. The conventional approaches and
reference frameworks of IoT network implementation are still unable to fulfil the
requirements of security [19]. Minhaj et al. [19] survey major security issues of
IoT and discuss different countermeasures along with the blockchain solution.
This study, however, does not detail security challenges in the blockchain-based
IoT applications. Our study reviews the different blockchain-based IoT applica-
tions, discusses their security risks and potential countermeasures.
3 Survey Settings
In [20], a comprehensive approach is presented to perform a SLR. In this section,
we apply it to conduct a SLR on the security risks in the blockchain-based
applications.
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3.1 Review Method
In order to achieve the objectives of this study, we consider four research ques-
tions: (i) What are the domains where blockchain solutions are applied? (ii)
What security risks are mitigated by the blockchain solutions? (iii) What do se-
curity risks appear within the blockchain-based applications? (iv) What are the
countermeasures to mitigate security risks in the blockchain-based applications?
Selection of databases. The selection of electronic databases and litera-
ture search is carried out by consulting with the experts of software security.
Literature studies are collected from ACM digital library, IEEE digital library,
ScienceDirect, SpringerLink and Scopus. The search queries (including some
alternative terms and synonyms) are formulated as follows:
Blockchain applications security (risks, threats, gaps, issues, challenges), permis-
sioned blockchain applications security, permissionless blockchain applications
security, public blockchain applications security
Relevance and Quality Assessment. The inclusion and exclusion criteria
listed in Table 1. In this study, we only include the peer-reviewed literature
because most of the grey literature is based on assumptions, abstract concepts
and prejudices towards the security of their applications. Based on these shreds
of evidence the grey literature could lead to the publication bias and erroneous
results, so in order to eliminate these concerns only peer-reviewed literature is
considered.
Table 1. Inclusion and exclusion criteria.
Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria
Only the peer-reviewed literature Literature that does not subject to peer
review
Literature studies that discuss security
risks in the blockchain-based applications
Grey literature or informal studies with no
concrete evidence
The selection of the studies was made after reading the paper title, abstract,
introduction and conclusion sections. Finally, following the quality guidelines of
[20] and research scope of our study we have assessed the quality of studies using
the following questions:
– Are the goals and purpose of a study is clearly stated?
– Is the study describes security risks on the blockchain-based applications?
– Is the study provide the countermeasures to mitigate security risks?
– Is the study answered the defined research questions?
– How well the research results are presented?
The answers to the above questions are scored as follows: 1=Fully satisfy, 0.5=Par-
tially satisfy, 0=Not satisfy. The studies with 2.5 or more points are included.
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3.2 Screening Results Table 2. Literature studies.
Database Total Excl. Incl.
ACM 21 11 10
IEEE 31 9 22
ScienceDirect 22 15 7
SpringerLink 23 12 11
Scopus 44 26 18
Total 141 73 68
Table 2 presents the screening results. Initially,
a total of 141 studies was collected. Later
73 studies were excluded by applying inclu-
sion/exclusion and quality assessment criteria.
Finally, 68 studies remained1. The extracted information outlines the study iden-
tification, research problem, security risks and countermeasures.
4 Results and discussion
Table 3. Statistics of literature studies as per year.
Permissionless Permissioned
Bitcoin Ethereum CPL HLF CP Generic Total
2016 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
2017 7 3 8 1 2 1 22
2018 9 15 3 8 8 1 44
Total 18 18 11 9 10 2 68
In this section, we present
the SLR results. Table 3
shows how the field of
blockchain-based applications
is emerging every year. We
observe that Ethereum-based applications are gaining popularity among oth-
ers. Also, permissioned blockchain platforms (Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) &
Customised Permissioned (CP)) are arising because of those support various
industry-based use cases beyond cryptocurrencies. Practitioners also presented
various Customised Permissionless (CPL) platforms to achieve customised tasks
and to overcome the limitations of other platforms. The term Generic refers to
studies where the blockchain type and platform is not mentioned.
4.1 Applications Domains
Table 4 presents the quantity of applications domains & technology solutions
based on the different blockchain platforms. It showsHealthcare is mostly studied
Table 4. Research areas based on different blockchain platforms.
Permissionless Permissioned
Bitcoin Ethereum CPL HLF CP Generic Total
Applications domains where blockchain is used.
Healthcare 0 3 1 2 4 1 11
Resource monitoring & Dig-
ital rights management
1 3 2 0 2 1 9
Financial 2 1 1 1 0 0 5
Smart vehicles 1 0 1 1 2 0 5
Voting 1 1 0 2 0 0 4
Technology solutions where blockchain is used.
Security layer 6 7 1 0 1 0 15
IoT 2 2 1 2 2 0 9
Total 13 17 7 8 11 2 58
application domain and security layer as a technology solution. Also, it indicates
that Ethereum is widely used blockchain platform for building the decentralized
applications.
1 Here is a list of these SLR studies: http://datadoi.ut.ee/handle/33/89
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4.2 Security Risks
Security risks result in harm to the system and its components [18]. In our study,
the identified security risks are classified into two categories. (i) Security risks
which are mitigated by introducing the blockchain-based applications (see Ta-
ble 5), and (ii) Security risks which appear within the blockchain-based applica-
tions (see Table 6). Table 5 presents the most common security risks which show
that the researchers are utilizing the blockchain-based applications to overcome
the limitations of centralized applications. For example, data tampering attack
is mitigated in Healthcare applications and DDoS attack/Single point failure is
resisted by decentralized distributed property of blockchain.
Table 5. Security risks which are mitigated by introducing blockchain applications.
Permissionless Permissioned
Bitcoin Ethereum CPL HFL CP Generic Total
Data tampering attack 7 8 4 7 5 1 32
DoS/DDoS attack 7 7 5 3 2 1 25
MitM attack 3 6 2 2 0 1 14
Identity theft/Hijacking 1 0 3 0 0 1 5
Spoofing attack 2 0 1 0 1 0 4
Other risks/threats 6 4 2 1 2 2 17
Total 26 25 17 13 10 6 97
In addition to risks in Table 5, other risks (found once or twice in the stud-
ies) are: Side-channel attack, Impersonation attack, Phishing attack, Password
attack, Cache poisoning, Arbitrary attack, Dropping attack, Appending attack,
Authentication attack, Signature forgery attack, Keyword guess attack, Cho-
sen message attack, Audit server attack, Inference attack, Binding attack and
Bleichenbach-style attack
Table 6 represents the most common security risks which appear within the
blockchain-based applications after introducing the blockchain technology. The
table indicates the security risks, which have a high probability to make the
blockchain-based applications vulnerable to attack.
Table 6. Security risks which appear within the blockchain applications.
Permissionless Permissioned
Bitcoin Ethereum CPL HLF CP Generic Total
Sybil attack 5 1 1 4 1 1 13
Double spending attack 4 1 2 2 0 1 10
51% attack 3 3 1 0 0 1 8
Deanonymization attack 2 1 3 0 0 1 7
Replay attack 2 4 1 0 0 0 7
Quantum computing threat 0 1 1 2 0 1 5
Selfish mining attack 1 0 2 1 0 0 4
SC reentrancy attack 0 2 0 0 0 1 3
Other risks/threats 6 1 6 3 1 3 20
Total 23 14 17 12 2 9 77
Hence the Sybil attack, Double spending attack and 51% attack are the most
appeared security risks after incorporating the blockchain technology. Other se-
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curity risks which are appeared once or twice in the studies are: Eclipse attack,
BWH attack, 25% attack, Stake grinding attack, Block Discarding attack, Dif-
ficulty Raising attack, Pool-hopping attack, Node masquerading attack, Times-
tamp attack, Balance attack, Signature forgery attack, Confidentiality attack,
Private keys compromise, Overspending attack, Collusion attack and Illegal ac-
tivities.
In Table 7 we encompass the security risks along with the blockchain-based
applications research areas to show which security risks are more frequently oc-
curring on different blockchain-based applications. Most frequently the security
risks expose in Resource monitoring and digital rights management applications,
followed by the Financial, Healthcare, Smart vehicles and Voting applications.
Also, blockchain is presented as a technology solution where researchers incor-
porated the blockchain as a security layer to protect against the listed security
risks. However, Table 7 shows 34 different security risks (combining both security
risks which are mitigated and appear by introducing the blockchain solution). Fur-
thermore, a blockchain technology solution for IoT based applications is rapidly
increasing because it provides integrity, reliability and security [19] and these
are important for IoT based solutions to reach high requirements of security.
By the results, the most common security risks in IoT based applications are
mitigated by implementing the blockchain-based solution and only 3 different
security risks are inherited after introducing the blockchain solution. The other
column represents the generic blockchain-based applications and blockchain tech-
nology solutions where no specific domain is studied.
Table 7. Security risks based on the research areas.
Security risks which are mitigated by introducing blockchain applications.
Applications Technology
Healthcare Resource
monit.
Financial Smart
vehicles
Voting Security
layer
IoT other Total
Data tampering attack 6 5 1 4 3 2 5 6 32
DoS/DDoS attack 0 5 1 3 1 7 3 5 25
MitM attack 1 4 1 1 1 2 2 2 14
Identity theft/Hijacking 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 5
Spoofing attack 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 4
Other risks/threats 2 0 1 0 1 5 5 3 17
Security risks which appear within the blockchain applications.
Sybil attack 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 5 13
Double spending attack 0 4 2 0 0 2 0 2 10
51% attack 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 2 8
Deanonymization attack 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 7
Replay attack 0 2 1 0 0 4 0 0 7
Quantum comp. threat 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 5
Selfish mining attack 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 4
SC reentrancy attack 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3
Other risks/threats 0 11 5 0 0 2 1 1 20
Total 12 41 15 10 11 34 20 31 174
4.3 Countermeasures
In this section, we overview countermeasures to mitigate the security risks listed
in Table 5 and 6.
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Countermeasures introduced with blockchain solution. The security
risks presented in Table 5 are mitigated by implementing the blockchain-based
applications together with the techniques to mitigate these risks. For instance,
Data tampering attack poses a threat to data-sensitive applications. In [40,41]
authors implement the smart contract to mitigate votes tampering. In [35,40]
authors encrypt information and associate a unique hash. Lei et al. [9] propose
a random oracle model with strong RSA. And Li et al. [23] introduce an el-
liptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) based signature scheme for
anonymous data transmission along Merkle hash tree based selective disclosure
mechanism. Han et al. [16] propose to use permissioned blockchain where only
the authorized nodes are able to access the data as well as generate a cypher-text
by using digital signatures.
DoS/DDoS attack is another exploitable cyber-attack, it is resisted by a
distribution of service on different nodes [40]. The [25,11] authors implement
an access control scheme to prevent unauthorized requests. Androulaki et al. [3]
propose a block-list to track suspicious requesting nodes and the authors of [3,32]
incorporate the transaction fee to resist it. In order to resist the MitM attack,
authors suggest to encrypt an information [10,40] and publish on the blockchain
[40]. In [25,38] research studies, an authentication scheme is introduced to verify
each communication node. Identity theft/Hijacking based risks are mitigated by
information authentication and message generation time-stamping [13]. Mylrea
et al. [30] suggest a permission-based solutions (e.g. KSI). Spoofing attack is miti-
gated by introducing an anonymous communication among nodes [8] and Keyless
Signature Infrastructure (KSI) based distributed & witnesses trust anchor [30].
Countermeasures to mitigate security risks of blockchain solutions.
The blockchain solution comes with a few trade-offs and inherits several security
risks (see Table 6) of blockchain technology which are mitigated by implementing
the various techniques, those techniques are listed below as countermeasures. In
order to mitigate the Sybil attack, in [15,41] authors suggest the permissioned
blockchain-based application. Bartolucci et al. [5] incorporate the transaction
fee & identification system to allow only authorized users to perform different
operations. In [32], authors use the PoR scheme and Liu et al. [27] implement the
customised blockchain to control the computing power. Double spending attack is
mitigated by the transaction verification based on unspent transaction state [3].
In [1] authors resisted this attack by PoA scheme and in [6] by PoW complexity.
Also, the Muzammal et al. [29] append the nonce with each transaction. Another
frequent security risk on the blockchain-based applications is 51% attack which
is resisted by implementing trusted authorities control [43] and Hjalmarsson et
al. [17] customised the Ethereum blockchain to permissioned blockchain.
In order to mitigate Deanonymization attack, in [25] authors propose a so-
lution to obtain identity information only after authorization. Bartolucci et al.
[5] propose the mixer for mixing the position of output addresses. In [33,37]
authors propose another solution to mitigate this attack by using the fresh key
for each transaction. Selfish mining attack is mitigated by PoR scheme [32] and
by raising the threshold [37]. No countermeasure is found for Replay attack. In
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order to overcome the Quantum computing threats, Yin et al. [39] implement the
lattice cryptography and in [6] authors suggest an additional digital signature
or a hard fork in the post-quantum era. Decusatis et al. [11] propose a need
of quantum blockchain. To eliminate the chances of Smart contract reentrancy
attack, authors of [26] present the automation tool to detect smart contract bugs
via run-time trace analysis and in [36] authors built a static analysis tool that
detects reentrancy bugs in a smart contract and translates solidity source code
into an XML-based intermediate representation and checks it against XPath
patterns.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we present a systematic literature review on the blockchain-based
applications security risks to explain what security risks are mitigated by intro-
ducing the blockchain-based applications, and what security risks are reported
in the blockchain-based applications. Our result is a preliminary checklist to
support developers’ decisions while developing blockchain-based applications.
Our current study has a few limitations: (i) Applications which are built on
the blockchain platforms are mostly in the prototype phase. Thus the research
studies present only the conceptual illustrations of different security risks and
their countermeasures but not the real-life applications. (ii) The field of de-
centralized applications is relatively new but continuously evolving. Not all the
possible security risks are researched in the blockchain-based applications which
show the possibility that a wide range of security risks will emerge in upcoming
years. (iii) This study found that a lot of security risks and their countermea-
sures are either obscure or the practical implementation is still not available.
Overcoming these limitations could possibly result in the interesting insights
and contribute to the explaining the blockchain-based application security risks,
their vulnerabilities and the countermeasures for more in-depth.
As a part of the future work, our aim is to build a comprehensive refer-
ence model for security risk management to systematically evaluate the security
needs. This model would explain the protected assets of the blockchain-based
applications, and countermeasures to mitigate their risks.
Acknowledgement. This research has been supported by the Estonian Re-
search Council (grant IUT20-55).
References
1. Alcarria, R., Bordel, B., Robles, T., Mart´ın, D., Manso-Callejo, M.A´.: A
blockchain-based authorization system for trustworthy resource monitoring and
trading in smart communities. In: Journal of Sensors (Switzerland) 18(10) (2018)
2. Ali, S., Wang, G., White, B., Cottrell, R.L.: A Blockchain-Based Decentralized
Data Storage and Access Framework for PingER. In: Proceedings of 17th IEEE
10 M. Iqbal & R. Matulevicˇius
International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Com-
munications and 12th IEEE International Conference on Big Data Science and
Engineering, Trustcom/BigDataSE 2018 pp. 1303–1308 (2018)
3. Androulaki, E., Barger, A., Bortnikov, V., Cachin, C., Christidis, K., De Caro, A.,
Enyeart, D., Ferris, C., Laventman, G., Manevich, Y., Muralidharan, S., Murthy,
C., Nguyen, B., Sethi, M., Singh, G., Smith, K., Sorniotti, A., Stathakopoulou, C.,
Vukolic´, M., Cocco, S.W., Yellick, J.: Hyperledger Fabric: A Distributed Operating
System for Permissioned Blockchains. In: Proceedings of EuroSys ’18 Thirteenth
EuroSys Conference Article No.30 (2018)
4. Atzei, N., Bartoletti, M., Cimoli, T.: A survey of attacks on Ethereum smart con-
tracts (SoK). In: Proceedings of 6th International Conference on Principles of Se-
curity and Trust - Volume 10204 Pages 164-186 April 22 - 29, 2017 (2017)
5. Bartolucci, S., Bernat, P., Joseph, D.: SHARVOT: secret SHARe-based VOTing
on the blockchain. In: Proceedings of ACM/IEEE 1st International Workshop on
Emerging Trends in Software Engineering for Blockchain (2018), 30–34 (2018)
6. Buchmann, N., Rathgeb, C., Baier, H., Busch, C., Margraf, M.: Enhancing Breeder
Document Long-Term Security Using Blockchain Technology. In: Proceedings of
International Computer Software and Applications Conference 2, 744–748 (2017)
7. Buterin, V.: A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application
Platform (2014), https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper
8. Cebe, M., Erdin, E., Akkaya, K., Aksu, H., Uluagac, S.: Block4Forensic: An Inte-
grated Lightweight Blockchain Framework for Forensics Applications of Connected
Vehicles. In: Journal of IEEE Communications Magazine ( Volume: 56 , Issue: 10
, OCTOBER 2018 ) (October), 50–57 (2018)
9. Chen, L.: EPBC : Efficient Public Blockchain Client for Lightweight Users. In:
Proceedings of SERIAL ’17 1st Workshop on Scalable and Resilient Infrastructures
for Distributed Ledgers Article No. 1
10. Dagher, G.G., Mohler, J., Milojkovic, M., Marella, P.B.: Ancile: Privacy-preserving
framework for access control and interoperability of electronic health records using
blockchain technology. In: Journal of Sustainable Cities and Society 39(December
2017), 283–297 (2018)
11. Decusatis, C., Lotay, K.: Secure, Decentralized Energy Resource Management Us-
ing the Ethereum Blockchain. In: Proceedings of 17th IEEE International Con-
ference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications and
12th IEEE International Conference on Big Data Science and Engineering, Trust-
com/BigDataSE 2018 pp. 1907–1913 (2018)
12. Fabian Vogelsteller, V.B.: Proof of Stake FAQs (2018),
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/Proof-of-Stake-FAQs
13. Fan, K., Wang, S., Ren, Y., Yang, K., Yan, Z., Li, H., Yang, Y.: Blockchain-based
Secure Time Protection Scheme in IoT. In: Journal of IEEE Internet of Things
PP(c), 1 (2018)
14. Firesmith, D.G.: Cite this column as follows: Donald Firesmith: Engineering Se-
curity Requirements. In: Journal of Object Technology, Published by ETH Zurich,
Chair of Software Engineering JOT, 2003 2(1), 53–68 (2003)
15. Gallo, P., Quoc Nguyen, U.: BlockSee: Blockchain for IoT video surveillance in
smart cities Suporn Pongnumkul NECTEC Thailand. In: Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering and 2018
IEEE Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Europe (EEEIC / I&CPS Eu-
rope) pp. 1–6 (2018)
Blockchain-based Application Security Risks 11
16. Han, H., Huang, M., Zhang, Y.: An Architecture of Secure Health Information Stor-
age System Based on Blockchain Technology. In: Proceedings of International Con-
ference on Computer and Communication Systems (ICCCS) 2018, LNCS 11064,
pp. 578588, 2018 (2018)
17. Hjalmarsson, F.P., Hreioarsson, G.K., Hamdaqa, M., Hjalmtysson, G.:
Blockchain-Based E-Voting System. In: Proceedings of IEEE 11th Inter-
national Conference on Cloud Computing (CLOUD) pp. 983–986 (2018),
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8457919/
18. Jouini, M., Rabai, L.B.A., Aissa, A.B.: Classification of security threats in infor-
mation systems. In: Proceedings of Procedia Computer Science 32(October 2017),
489–496 (2014)
19. Khan, M.A., Salah, K.: IoT security: Review, blockchain solutions, and open chal-
lenges. In: Journal of Future Generation Computer Systems 82 (2018)
20. Kitchenham, B., Charters, S.: Guidelines for performing Systematic Literature
reviews in Software Engineering Version 2.3. Engineering 45(4ve), 1051 (2007)
21. Koteska, B., Mishev, A.: Blockchain Implementation Quality Challenges: A Lit-
erature Review. In: Proceedings of the SQAMIA 2017: 6th Workshop of Software
Quality, Analysis, Monitoring, Improvement, and Applications (September), 11–13
(2017)
22. Lewis, A.: Blockchain Technology Explained (2015),
http://www.blockchaintechnologies.com/blockchain-definition
23. Li, H., Lu, R., Misic, J., Mahmoud, M.: Security and Privacy of Connected Ve-
hicular Cloud Computing. In: Journal of IEEE Network ( Volume: 32 , Issue: 3 ,
May/June 2018 ) 32(3), 4–6 (2018)
24. Li, X., Jiang, P., Chen, T., Luo, X., Wen, Q.: A survey on the security of blockchain
systems. In: Journal of Future Generation Computer Systems (2017)
25. Lin, C., He, D., Huang, X., Choo, K.K.R., Vasilakos, A.V.: BSeIn: A blockchain-
based secure mutual authentication with fine-grained access control system for
industry 4.0. In: Journal of Network and Computer Applications 116(February),
42–52 (2018)
26. Liu, C., Liu, H., Cao, Z., Chen, Z., Chen, B., Roscoe, B.: ReGuard: Finding reen-
trancy bugs in smart contracts. In: Proceedings of International Conference on
Software Engineering pp. 65–68 (2018)
27. Liu, M., Shang, J., Liu, P.: VideoChain : Trusted Video Surveillance Based on
Blockchain for Campus. In: Proceedings of ICCCS 2018: Cloud Computing and
Security pp 48-58 (2018)
28. Macrinici, D., Cartofeanu, C., Gao, S.: Smart Contract Applica-
tions within Blockchain Technology: A Systematic Mapping Study.
In: Journal of Telematics and Informatics (October), 0–1 (2018),
https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0736585318308013
29. Muzammal, M., Qu, Q., Nasrulin, B.: Renovating blockchain with distributed
databases: An open source system. In: Journal of Future Generation Computer
Systems 90, 105–117 (2018)
30. Mylrea, M., Gourisetti, S.N.G.: Blockchain for smart grid resilience: Exchanging
distributed energy at speed, scale and security. In: Proceedings of 2017 Resilience
Week, RWS 2017 pp. 18–23 (2017)
31. Pradeepkumar, D.S., Singi, K., Kaulgud, V., Podder, S.: Evaluating complexity and
digitizability of regulations and contracts for a blockchain application design. In:
Proceedings of 2018 ACM/IEEE 1st International Workshop on Emerging Trends
in Software Engineering for Blockchain (1), 25–29 (2018)
12 M. Iqbal & R. Matulevicˇius
32. Qin, D., Wang, C., Jiang, Y.: RPchain: A Blockchain-Based Aca-
demic Social Networking Service for Credible Reputation Building, vol.
10974. In: Proceedings of ICBC 2018: Blockchain pp 183-198 (2018),
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-94478-4
33. Saritekin, R.A., Karabacak, E., Duray, Z., Karaarslan, E.: Blockchain based secure
communication application proposal: Cryptouch. In: Proceedings of 6th Interna-
tional Symposium on Digital Forensic and Security, ISDFS 2018 2018-Janua, 1–4
(2018)
34. Sato, T., Himura, Y.: Smart-Contract Based System Operations for Permissioned
Blockchain. In: Proceedings of 2018 9th IFIP International Conference on New
Technologies, Mobility and Security, NTMS 2018 2018-Janua, 1–6 (2018)
35. Sylim, P., Liu, F., Marcelo, A., Fontelo, P.: Blockchain technology for detecting
falsified and substandard drugs in distribution: Pharmaceutical supply chain in-
tervention. In: Journal of Medical Internet Research 20(9) (2018)
36. Tikhomirov, S., Voskresenskaya, E., Ivanitskiy, I., Takhaviev, R., Marchenko, E.,
Alexandrov, Y.: SmartCheck: Static Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts. In:
Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Emerging Trends in Software
Engineering for Blockchain - WETSEB ’18 (October), 9–16 (2018)
37. Tosh, D.K., Shetty, S., Liang, X., Kamhoua, C.A., Kwiat, K.A., Njilla, L.: Security
Implications of Blockchain Cloud with Analysis of Block Withholding Attack. In:
Proceedings of 17th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Cluster, Cloud and
Grid Computing, CCGRID 2017 pp. 458–467 (2017)
38. Yao, H., Wang, C.: A novel blockchain-based authenticated key exchange protocol
and its applications. In: Proceedings of IEEE 3rd International Conference on Data
Science in Cyberspace, DSC 2018 pp. 609–614 (2018)
39. Yin, W.E.I., Wen, Q., Li, W., Zhang, H.U.A., Jin, Z.: An Anti-Quantum Transac-
tion Authentication Approach in Blockchain. In: Journal of IEEE Access ( Volume:
6 ) 6 (2018)
40. Yu, B., B, J.K.L., Sakzad, A., Steinfeld, R., Rimba, P., Au, M.H.: Platform-
Independent Secure Blockchain-Based Voting System, vol. 2433. In: Proceedings
of ISC 2018: Information Security pp 369-386 (2018)
41. Zhang, W.: A Privacy-Preserving Voting Protocol on Blockchain. In: Proceedings of
IEEE 11th International Conference on Cloud Computing (April), 401–408 (2018)
42. Zheng, Z., Xie, S., Dai, H.N., Chen, X., Wang, H.: Blockchain Challenges
and Opportunities : A Survey Shaoan Xie Hong-Ning Dai Huaimin Wang.
In: International Journal of Web and Grid Services 14(4), 1–24 (2016),
http://inpluslab.sysu.edu.cn/files/blockchain/blockchain.pdf
43. Zhu, L., Wu, Y., Gai, K., Choo, K.K.R.: Controllable and
trustworthy blockchain-based cloud data management. In: Jour-
nal of Future Generation Computer Systems 91, 527–535 (2018),
https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167739X18311993
This figure "Review_phases.png" is available in "png"
 format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/1912.09556v1
This figure "Review_process.png" is available in "png"
 format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/1912.09556v1
This figure "blockchain.png" is available in "png"
 format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/1912.09556v1
